

FEB 28 1979

WILLIAM J. RUDAK, JR., CLERK

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

No. **78-1328**

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

GALE BRABAND and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE,

Respondents.

**APPENDIX TO ACCOMPANY
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS**

**LORD, BISSELL & BROOK
115 S. LaSalle Street
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Attorneys for Petitioner

**WILLIAM P. BUTLER
GARY W. WESTERBERG
HUGH C. GRIFFIN**
Of Counsel

INDEX TO APPENDIX

	PAGE
Amended Complaint at Law	1
Motion to Quash	8
Circuit Court Order Denying Motion to Quash	12
Opinion of Illinois Appellate Court	14
Certificate of Importance Issued by Appellate Court	41
Opinion of Illinois Supreme Court	42
Order of Supreme Court Denying Petition for Re- hearing	55

APPENDIX

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) SS.
COUNTY OF COOK)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

No. 73 L 18675

GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES
L. BRABAND, Deceased, and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE,
Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE,
Deceased,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation,
KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMI-
CAL CORPORATION, a corporation, and EAGLE AIR-
CRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AT LAW

COUNT I

Now comes plaintiffs, GALE BRABAND, Administrator
of the Estate of JAMES L. BRABAND, Deceased; and
ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate
of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, Deceased, complains of the
defendant, BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, and KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF

App. 2

SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, as follows:

1. On and prior to December 10, 1971, the defendants, BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation, and KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, were duly organized and acting according to law and engaged in the business of designing, constructing, assembling, selling and distributing certain aircraft and avionic systems and component parts and in particular, did design, construct, assemble and sell a certain Beechcraft Queen Air 65 B 80 Multi-engine aircraft, registration number N-929V, Serial number LD-325 (hereinafter referred to as the "airplane"); and, defendant, KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, did design, construct, assemble and sell an avionic component known as Kollsman Altimeter which was included as one of the avionic components in said airplane (hereinafter referred to as the "altimeter").

2. On and prior to December 10, 1971, defendant, Beech Aircraft Corporation transacted business in Illinois by and through its various agents and employees including but not limited to COLEMAN AIRCRAFT INC., a corporation and NATIONAL AIR INC., a corporation.

3. On December 10, 1971, plaintiff's decedents and JAMES N. GOING were aboard the said airplane as occupants riding within the airplane from Chicago, Illinois to London, England via the airport at Frobisher Bay in the Northwest Territories, Canada.

4. At the time and place aforesaid, the airplane and the altimeter were designed, manufactured, assembled and sold in a condition that was not reasonably safe in one or more of the following respects:

App. 3

- a. That the airplane was not aerodynamically sound and was likely to crash when used and/or flown in a reasonably foreseeable manner.
- b. That the altimeter was manufactured in such a manner that it did not reflect accurate altitude readings for the airplane when said airplane was airborne and when the aircraft was being flown in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable.
- c. That the altimeter was manufactured and sold without any warnings that it was likely not to reflect accurate altitude readings for the aircraft when said aircraft was airborne and when the aircraft was being flown in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable.

5. As a proximate result of one or more of the foregoing unsafe conditions of the airplane and the altimeter, plaintiff's decedents were killed when the airplane crashed on December 10, 1971.

6. At the time and place aforesaid plaintiff's decedents JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE were in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety.

7. The plaintiff, GALE BRABAND, administrator of the Estate of JAMES L. BRABAND, deceased, and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, deceased, bring herewith Letters of Administration granted them by the Probate Court, Cook County, Illinois as evidence to their right to sue.

8. On December 10, 1971, there was in full force and effect in the State of Illinois the statute commonly known as the Wrongful Death Act, Chapter 70, Section 1 and 2 of the Illinois Revised Statute and plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to said act.

App. 4

9. The decedent, James L. Braband left surviving the following:

GALE BRABAND, his wife;
PHILIP JAMES BRABAND, his son
JOSEPH ALLEN BRABAND, his son
AMY LINNE BRABAND, his daughter

The decedent, Donald R. Forsythe, left surviving the following:

ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, his wife;
PATRICIA FORSYTHE, his daughter
MICHAEL FORSYTHE, his son
SUSAN FORSYTHE, his daughter
TIMOTHY FORSYTHE, his son

10. Each of the survivors of the decendants' JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE, have sustained substantial pecuniary loss as a proximate result of the death of their respective decedents.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, Deceased; asks for judgment against the defendants, BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation and KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, in the sum of ONE MILLION (\$1,000,000.00) DOLLARS.

COUNT II

Now comes plaintiffs, GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the ESTATE of JAMES L. BRABAND, Deceased, and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, Deceased, and complaints of the defendant, EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation, as follows:

1. On or prior to December 10, 1971, EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD., (hereinafter referred to as

App. 5

"EAGLE"), owned, operated, managed, maintained and controlled an airplane known as a Beechcraft Queen Air 65 B 80 Multiengine aircraft, registration number N-929V, Serial number LD-325, (hereinafter referred to as the "airplane").

2. On and prior to December 10, 1971, the defendant, EAGLE, contracted with the plaintiffs' decedents and JAMES N. GOING to transport, pilot and/or ferry the airplane from Chicago, Illinois to London, England, via the airport at Frobisher Bay in the Northwest Territories, Canada.

3. On and prior to December 10, 1971, the defendant, EAGLE, had purchased the airplane from COLEMAN AIRCRAFT, INC., of Morton Grove, Illinois, and gave permission of, bailed and entrusted the airplane to the plaintiff's decedents and JAMES N. GOING for the purpose of ferring said airplane from Chicago, Illinois to London, England.

4. On and prior to December 10, 1971, defendant, EAGLE, was a corporation duly organized according to the laws of England and was doing business in the State of Illinois.

5. On and prior to December 10, 1971, plaintiffs' decedents and JAMES N. GOING, occupied the airplane from Chicago, Illinois to a point somewhere in Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories, Canada.

6. At the time and place aforesaid and while attempting a landing approach from the southwest, the airplane struck a terrain obstacle some distance southwest of Frobisher Bay and crashed.

7. At the time and place aforesaid plaintiffs' decedents JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE, were in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety.

App. 6

8. Prior to and at the time of the occurrence complained of, defendant, EAGLE, by and through its various agents and employees while acting in the course and scope of their employment, was guilty of one or more of the following negligent acts or omissions:

- a. Entrusted, bailed and gave possession of the airplane to the plaintiffs' decedents in a condition which was not reasonably safe so as to be a proximate cause of death of decedents.
- b. Failed to service and maintain the airplane, in accordance with applicable maintenance and service regulations as prescribed by the Federal Aviation Agency.
- c. Failed to inspect and test the airplane to determine the airworthiness of the control and navigation mechanisms including but not limited to the automatic pilot assembly.

9. As a proximate result of one or more of the foregoing negligent acts and omissions, the airplane crashed, and the plaintiffs' decedents, JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE, came to their death on December 10, 1971.

10. The decedent, JAMES L. BRABAND, left surviving the following:

GALE BRABAND, his wife
PHILIP JAMES BRABAND, his son
JOSEPH ALLEN BRABAND, his son
AMY LINNE BRABAND, his daughter

The decedent, DONALD R. FORSYTHE, left surviving the following:

ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, his wife
PATRICIA FORSYTHE, his daughter
MICHAEL FORSYTHE, his son
SUSAN FORSYTHE, his daughter
TIMOTHY FORSYTHE, his son

App. 7

11. Each of the survivors of the decedents, JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE, have sustained substantial pecuniary loss as a proximate result of the death of their respective decedents.

12. Before and at the time of the occurrence complained of, each of the survivors of the decedents, JAMES L. BRABAND and DONALD R. FORSYTHE, was in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety.

13. On December 10, 1971, there was in full force and effect in the State of Illinois the statute commonly known as the Wrongful Death Act Chapter 70 Section 1 and 2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes and plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to said act.

14. The plaintiff, GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES L. BRABAND, deceased, and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, deceased, bring herewith Letters of Administration granted them by the Probate Court, Cook County, Illinois as evidence to their right to sue.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, Deceased asks judgment against the defendant, EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation, in the sum of ONE MILLION (\$1,000,000.00) DOLLARS.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES L. BRABAND, Deceased, asks for judgment against the defendant, EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation, in the sum of ONE MILLION (\$1,000,000.00) DOLLARS.

/s/ Philip H. Corboy & Assocs.
Attorney for Plaintiff

App. 8

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) SS.
COUNTY OF COOK)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

No. 73 L 18675

GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES
L. BRABAND, Deceased; and, ELIZABETH FORSYTHE,
Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE,
Deceased,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation,
KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMI-
CAL CORPORATION, a corporation, and EAGLE AIR-
CRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants.

Filed May 13, 1974

MOTION TO QUASH

NOW COMES defendant BEECH AIRCRAFT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, by its attorneys LORD, BIS-
SELL & BROOK, appearing specially herein solely and
specifically for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over this defendant and for such purpose,
and only for such purpose, moves the court to vacate and
quash the service attempted to be made on it directly or

App. 9

through its alleged agents in this cause. In support of said
motion defendant BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
files herewith and makes part hereof a copy of the affidavit
of JOHN A. ELLIOT which affidavit has been previously
filed herein.

LORD, BISSELL & BROOK

By:
Attorneys for Defendant
Beech Aircraft Corporation
Appearing Specially

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

No. 73 L 18675

GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES L. BRABAND, Deceased; and, ELIZABETH FORSYTHE, Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE, Deceased,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation, KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, and EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. ELLIOTT

STATE OF KANSAS)
) SS:
COUNTY OF SEDGWICK)

Personally appeared before the undersigned officer duly authorized to administer oaths, John A. Elliott, who on oath deposes and testifies as follows:

1. My name is John A. Elliott. I am Vice President and Treasurer of Beech Aircraft Corporation ("Beech"), defendant in the above-entitled case, and I am a resident of Wichita, Kansas. I make this affidavit for use in support of defendant Beech's attack on jurisdiction in this case, and for all other purposes authorized by law.

2. Beech has no officers, directors or employees living or residing or stationed in Illinois.

3. Beech has no offices, plants, factories or other places of business in Illinois.

4. Beech is not qualified, authorized or otherwise licensed or chartered to do business in Illinois under Illinois corporation laws, and Beech has no agent for service of process in Illinois. Beech is not an Illinois corporation.

5. Beech does not own or lease any real estate in Illinois.

6. Beech does not hold any licenses, charters or permits granted or issued by the State of Illinois or by any county or municipal government in Illinois.

7. Beech is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. Beech's principal office and place of business is in Wichita, Kansas. In addition to Delaware and Kansas, Beech is authorized and qualified under the laws of Colorado to do business in that state. Beech is not authorized or qualified to do business under the laws of any other state.

8. Beech does not pay any Illinois taxes.

9. The accident involving a Queen Air B80 bearing Beech serial number LD325 and Federal Aviation Registration Number N-929V occurred on December 10, 1971 at Frobisher Bay, Canada and not in the state of Illinois.

John A. Elliott

JOHN A. ELLIOTT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public on the 7th day of January, 1974.

Jeanne M. Hildebrant

Notary Public

My commission Expires:

July 19, 1977

(Notary Seal)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT — LAW DIVISION

No. 72 L 16617

GALE BRABAND, Administrator of the Estate of JAMES
L. BRABAND, Deceased, and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE,
Administrator of the Estate of DONALD R. FORSYTHE,
Deceased,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a corporation,
KOLLSMAN COMPANY, DIVISION OF SUN CHEMI-
CAL CORPORATION, a corporation, and EAGLE AIR-
CRAFT SERVICES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants.

Entered 7/28/75

ORDER

Proposed — *Agreed*

This matter having come on for hearing on the motion of BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION appearing specially to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and quash service of process on the ground that defendant BEECH is not amenable to process issued by a Court of the State of Illinois, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

1. Beech can foresee and knows that aircraft which they manufacture will be flown by Illinois residents;

2. The crash of the Beech Queen Air aircraft near Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories, Canada, resulted in the death of plaintiffs' decedents who were residents of the State of Illinois;

3. It does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and effective justice to require Beech to defend this action in the courts of Illinois, when the action involves deaths of Illinois residents because of an alleged defect in the aircraft, and;

4. That, based upon the above findings, defendant Beech is amenable to process issued by a court of the State of Illinois with respect to this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. That defendant Beech's motion to dismiss is denied, and

2. That defendant Beech shall answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs' complaint within 28 days.

THE COURT FURTHER SPECIFICALLY FINDS:

1. That this order involves a question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and

2. That an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

....., 1975

ENTER:

PHILIP H. CORBOY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
33 North Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602
346-3191

OPINION OF ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT

Gale BRABAND and Elizabeth Forsythe,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant,

and

Kollsman Company, Division of Sun Chemical Corporation
and Eagle Aircraft Services, Ltd.,
Defendants.

No. 62340.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Second Division.

July 19, 1977.

Administrators of estate of two pilots, Illinois residents who were killed in crash of airplane in Canada after plane took off for England from Illinois where it had been based for period of time, brought suits under Wrongful Death Act against foreign corporation which manufactured aircraft in Kansas. After consolidation of suits for trial, the Circuit Court, Cook County, Nicholas J. Bua, P. J., denied manufacturer's motion to quash service of process and certified question for interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Court, Jiganti, J., held that: (1) word "tortious" in long-arm statute included delivery of allegedly defective plane; (2) manufacturer had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to satisfy due process requirements; (3) accordingly, Illinois court had jurisdiction over manufacturer on basis of "tortious act" committed in Illinois and (4) manufacturer was not engaged in continuous and systematic course of business in Illinois so as to give rise to jurisdiction under present and doing business theory.

Affirmed.

Stamos, filed specially concurring opinion.

Downing, P.J., filed dissenting opinion.

1. Corporations — 665(3)

Distinction between "present and doing business" theory and "transaction of business" theory is that under former, a corporation that engages in a continuous and systematic course of business in state becomes subject to state's jurisdiction even though subject lawsuit may have no relationship to business that corporation does within state, while under latter theory, if corporation transacts any business within state and cause of action arises from that transaction, then state has jurisdiction. S.H.A. ch. 110, §§ 13.3, 17(1)(a).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

2. Corporations — 665(3)

Word "tortious," considering history of word in its context in Civil Practice Act, included delivery of allegedly defective airplane to corporate buyer in Illinois and consequently, assuming due process demands were met, Illinois court had jurisdiction under long-term statute over foreign corporation which manufactured airplane in Kansas, in wrongful death actions brought by administrators of estates of two Illinois residents killed in crash in Canada after taking off for England from Illinois, where plane had been based for a period of time S.H.A. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b); S.H.A. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

3. Corporations—642(1)

Foreign corporation which manufactured in Kansas aircraft which was ultimately delivered to buyer in Illinois was not engaged in continuous and systematic course of business in Illinois so as to subject it to jurisdiction of Illinois court under "present and doing business" theory in wrongful death actions arising out of crash in Canada after taking off for England from Illinois where plane had been based for period of time. S.H.A. ch. 110, § 13.3.

4. *Courts* — 12(2)

In determining scope of word “tortious” contained in long-arm statute, word had to be examined in light of due process tests for jurisdiction, i.e., fair and reasonable in circumstances, minimal contacts so that suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and contacts with state to make it reasonable for defendant to defend in a foreign state when estimating inconveniences, and in light of prior judicial interpretation that intent of legislature was that long-arm statute reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendant to extent permitted by due process. S.H.A. ch. 110, §§ 17, 17(1)(b); S.H.A.Const.1970, art. 2, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

5. *Torts* — 1

A tort, to be an actionable wrong, requires a duty, breach of duty and an injury.

6. *Torts* — 1

Whether injury or death, Illinois has right to provide redress against those who inflict injuries upon those within ambit of state’s legitimate protective policy.

7. *Courts* — 12(2)

Not all tortious acts necessarily satisfy minimum contacts required by due process for exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant under long-arm statute. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; S.H.A.Const.1970, art. 2, § 2; S.H.A. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b).

8. *Constitutional Law* — 305(6)

Where airplane sold to company in Illinois was based in that state for period of time prior to fatal crash in Canada while en route to England, pilots, Illinois residents, killed in that crash boarded plane in Illinois, and pecuniary loss resulting from loss of income and moral training and superintendence of education occurred in Illinois, foreign

corporation which manufactured airplane in Kansas had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to satisfy due process so as to afford Illinois court jurisdiction over manufacturer in wrongful death actions commenced against it by administrators of pilots’ estates S.H.A. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b); S.H.A.Const.1970, art. 2, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

9. *Corporations* — 665(3)

It is not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to say to manufacturer of transient product such as an airplane that it must defend lawsuit in a reasonably foreseeable place. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; S.H.A.Const.1970, art. 2, § 2.

10. *Courts* — 28

It was proper for Illinois court to estimate “inconveniences” in considering reasonableness of requiring foreign corporation, which manufactured airplane in Kansas, to defend away from its principal place of business wrongful death actions commenced by administrators of estates of two pilots, Illinois residents, killed in crash in Canada after taking off from Illinois for England. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; S.H.A.Const.1970, 2, § 2.

Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, for defendant-appellant;
Hugh C. Griffin, Chicago, of counsel.

Philip H. Corboy & Associates, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees; Susan E. Loggans, Chicago, of counsel.

JIGANTI, Justice:

The trial court denied the motion of Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) to quash the service of process. Beech objected to the jurisdiction of the court. The trial court certified the question for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110A, par. 308). This court in its discretion under the rule allowed an appeal from the order.

The parties filed an agreed statement of facts which they amended on two occasions. The essential facts are that the suit arises from the crash of a Beech designed and manufactured plane as it approached an airport located near Frobisher Bay in the Northwest Territories of Canada. Three people on board, all pilots, were killed. The plane was purchased by Coleman Aircraft Company of Morton Grove, Illinois and it appears that it had been based in Illinois for a period of time before the crash. It took off from Illinois on its final trip and was being ferried from Chicago to England. The plaintiffs' decedents were Illinois residents and their dependents are presently Illinois residents. The plaintiffs are administrators of the estates of two of the decedent pilots, James L. Braband and Donald R. Forsythe. The suits by the separate plaintiffs were consolidated for trial. They were brought under the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1970, ch. 70, pars. 1, 2).

The complaints as they pertained to Beech charged that the airplane and altimeter were designed, manufactured, assembled and sold in the condition that was not reasonably safe in that the airplane was not aerodynamically sound and was likely to crash when flown in a reasonably foreseeable manner; that the altimeter was manufactured in such a manner that it did not reflect accurate altitude readings when the aircraft was being flown in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable; and that the altimeter was manufactured and sold without any warnings that it was likely not to reflect an accurate altitude reading when being flown in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable. Further, as a proximate result of one or more of the unsafe conditions alleged the plaintiffs' decedents were killed when the plane crashed.

[1-3] The plaintiffs contend that the Illinois courts have jurisdiction because Beech committed a "tortious act" in Illinois under Civil Practice Act section 17(1)(b), the "long arm statute" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 17(1)(b)). The plaintiffs also contend that Beech was present and doing business in Illinois and jurisdiction attaches under Civil Practice Act section 13.3. The plaintiffs con-

cede that the court has not acquired jurisdiction under the transaction of business" section of the long arm statute, section 17(1)(a). The distinction between the "present and doing business theory" and the "transaction of business" theory is that under the former a corporation that engages in a continuous and systematic course of business in the State becomes subject to that State's jurisdiction even though the subject lawsuit may have no relationship to the business that the corporation does within the State. Under the latter theory, if the corporation transacts any business within the State and a cause of action arises from that transaction then the State has jurisdiction. (See, e. g., *Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.* (7 Cir. 1968), 407 F.2d 639; *Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International* (1967), 19 N.Y.2d 533, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 227 N.E.2d 851, aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 737, 283 N.Y.S.2d 99, 229 N.E.2d 696). This portion of the opinion will only deal with the issue concerning a "tortious act", section 17(1)(b). The concurring opinion will consider whether Beech was engaged in a continuous and systematic course of business in Illinois. I believe Illinois has jurisdiction because a "tortious act" was committed in Illinois, but do not believe that Beech engaged in a continuous and systematic course of business.

The Illinois Supreme Court in the case of *Nelson v. Miller*, (1957), 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, had occasion to consider the constitutionality of the 1955 amendments to sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act. Section 16 concerns itself with the manner of personal service of process outside of the State under the long-arm statute and is not pertinent to this opinion. The amendments to those sections authorized the entry of judgments *in personam* on personal service of summons outside of the State in enumerated classes of cases. The defendant in *Nelson* was a Wisconsin resident who sent one of his employees into Illinois to deliver an appliance. While in Illinois the employee allegedly negligently injured the plaintiff. The defendant in *Nelson* contended that he was denied due process of law in violation of the fourteenth

amendment of the Constitution of the United States and section 2 of article II of the Constitution of Illinois. The *Nelson* court commented that:

"Since *Pennoyer v. Neff*, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, was decided in 1878, significant social, technological, and legal developments have occurred. Rigid concepts have yielded to fiction, and fiction has yielded to forthright and realistic considerations of fairness in the determination of what constitutes jurisdiction to determine personal rights. * * * The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy. *The limits on the exercise of jurisdiction are not 'mechanical or quantitative' (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 159, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945),) but are to be found only in the requirement that the provisions made for this purpose must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances. * * *.*" *Nelson* at 383-4, 143 N.E.2d at 676. (Emphasis added.)

The *Nelson* court also quoted from *International Shoe*:

"* * * [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment *in personam*, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he has certain *minimum contacts* with it such that the maintenance of the suit *does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"*' (326 U.S. at page 316, 66 S.Ct. [154] at page 158.)" *Nelson* at 384, 143 N.E.2d at 677. (Emphasis added.)

Again *Nelson* quotes from *International Shoe*:

"[T]he demands of due process 'may be met by such contacts of [the defendant] with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An

"estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the [defendant] from a trial away from its "home" or principle place of business is relevant in this connection.' (326 U.S. at page 317, 66 S.Ct. [154] at page 158.)" *Nelson* at 385, 143 N.E.2d at 677.

The *Nelson* court determined the intent of the legislature:

"Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause." *Nelson*, at p. 389; 143 N.E.2d at p. 679.

The court in *Gray v. American Radiator* (1961), 22 Ill.2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, reiterated the interpretation of the legislative intention.

The *Gray* case in 1961 again examined the question of jurisdiction under the long arm statute. One of the defendants, Titan Valve, was a foreign corporation that manufactured safety valves in Ohio. One of its valves was incorporated into a water heater that exploded in Illinois. Titan Valve did not do business in Illinois, had no agent in Illinois and sold the valve to the manufacturer of the water heater outside of the State of Illinois. The court there in finding that Illinois had jurisdiction commented on *Nelson*:

"The *ratio decidendi* [in *Nelson*] was that Illinois has an interest in providing relief for injuries caused by persons having '*substantial contacts* within the State.' A standard of fairness or reasonableness was announced, within the limitation that defendant be given a realistic opportunity to appear and be heard. * * *

Under modern doctrine the power of a State court to enter a binding judgment against one not served with process within the State depends on two questions: first, whether he has certain minimum contacts with the State (see *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 E.Ld. 95, 102), and

second, whether there has been a reasonable method of notification. (See *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 104-105; *Nelson v. Miller*, 11 Ill.2d 378, 390, 143 N.E.2d 673.)" *Gray* at 436-37, 176 N.E.2d at 763. (Emphasis added.)

[4] The word "tortious" must be examined in the case at bar bearing in mind the due process tests for jurisdiction as established by the case law: fair and reasonable in the circumstances; minimal contacts so that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; contacts with the State that make it reasonable for a defendant to defend in a foreign State when estimating the inconveniences, and also the court's interpretation in *Nelson* and in *Gray* that the intent of the legislature was that section 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflected a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by due process. In *Nelson* the court said that the word "tortious" can be used to describe conduct that subjects the actor to tort liability and for that purpose the Restatement so uses it. (Restatement Torts section 6.) "It does not follow, however, that the word must have that meaning in a statute that is concerned with jurisdictional limits." (*Nelson*, 11 Ill.2d at 392, 143 N.E.2d at 680.) In *Poindexter v. Willis* (1967), 87 Ill.App.2d 213, 217-18, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3, the court in finding jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant said that the word "tortious" when used under section 17(1)(b), "* * * is not restricted to the technical definition of a tort, but includes any act committed in this State which involves a breach of duty to another and makes the one committing the act liable to respondent in damages." In *United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists* (N.D.Ill.1975), 396 F.Supp. 565, 571, the court in finding jurisdiction in an anti-trust case made the same statement.

[5, 6] Considering the expansive definition of the word "tortious" as stated in the case law, I believe that a tortious act was committed by the delivery into Illinois of a plane that was allegedly unreasonably dangerous. A tort to be

an actionable wrong, requires a duty, a breach of the duty and an injury. (*Mieher v. Brown* (1973), 54 Ill.2d 539, 531, 301 N.E.2d 307.) The chain culminating in the death of the plaintiffs' decedents began in Kansas with the breach of the duty when the allegedly defective plane was manufactured. That condition persisted until it became a cause of action with the crash in Canada causing the deaths. Between the manufacture and the crash the allegedly defective plane was purchased by an Illinois corporation and was based in Illinois for a period of time. A duty was owed to the residents of Illinois. The injury in the instant case is to the plaintiffs who reside in Illinois. Whether injury or death Illinois has the right to provide redress against those who inflict injuries upon "those within the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy". (*Nelson*, 11 Ill. 2d at 384, 143 N.E.2d at 676.) The concept that a party commits himself to this court's jurisdiction by a single act is not unusual. The court has sustained jurisdiction under 17(1)(a) in *Ward v. Formex Inc.* (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 22, 325 N.E.2d 812; *First Professional Leasing Co. v. Rappold* (1974), 23 Ill.App.3d 420, 319 N.E.2d 324; *Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman* (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 14, 308 N.E. 2d 78 and *Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine Co.* (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27. The word "tortious" considering the history of the word in its context in the Civil Practice Act should include the delivery of the allegedly defective plane.

[7, 8] The determination that "tortious" includes the delivery of the plane does not conclude the issue of jurisdiction. Thus far, due process requirements have been used to analyze the word "tortious". Now the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered to determine if the allegations measure up to the constitutional demands of due process. Due process requires minimum contacts. Not all tortious acts necessarily satisfy minimum contacts. In *McBreen v. Beech* (7th Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d 26 the court found that the tort of libel was committed by the defendant in Illinois but the defendant did not have the minimum contacts with Illinois and consequently there was no ju-

risdiction. I believe that in the case at bar there were minimum contacts to satisfy due process. The relationship between the parties that concerns us here is the allegedly defective plane and the damages to the plaintiffs. The situs of the crash which caused the death is wholly fortuitous and is an insignificant factor in the relationship of these parties to the lawsuit. The significant factors are the manufacturing of the allegedly defective plane and the contact that the plaintiffs and their decedents had with the plane. The manufacturing took place in Kansas. The most significant relationship between the decedents and the plane was centered here in Illinois where the plane was based and where the decedents boarded the plane and started their trip to England. The pecuniary loss resulting from the loss of income and moral training and superintendence of education occurred here in Illinois. (See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 2d 31.04.)

[9,10] It is not offensive to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to say to the manufacturer of a transient product such as an airplane that it must defend the lawsuit in a reasonably foreseeable place. Indeed, in *Gray*, 22 Ill.2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, the court noted that it was not unjust to hold a corporation answerable to a suit in another State where it elects to sell its product for ultimate use in that State. In the case at bar the ultimate use of the product was in Illinois as well as in a number of other places. In considering the reasonableness of requiring the corporation to defend the suit away from its principle place of business it is proper for the court to "estimate the inconveniences." The inconveniences in trying this case in the Northwest Territories of Canada where all the parties are residents of midwestern states is rather obvious. As between the residence of the defendant in Kansas and the plaintiff in Illinois the case is comparable to *Gray* where the court found jurisdiction in Illinois.

The Restatement of the Law, Second, Conflicts of Laws, section 37 provides:

"A State has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the State by

an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the State make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable."

The rationale given is that a State has a natural interest in the effects of an act within its territory and may exercise jurisdiction provided that the nature of the effects and the defendant's relationship were such to make the exercise fair and reasonable. An example is given of a defendant who explodes dynamite close to the border of the plaintiff's State where the plaintiff is injured. The example suggests that even without any other relationship the defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's State. Similarly, in the case at bar, the plaintiffs are Illinois residents and they have suffered injuries as a result of an occurrence that took place outside of the State of Illinois. The rationale given in the example in the Restatement is that the effects could have been anticipated and were highly dangerous to persons. The effects that could be caused by a defective plane are equally to be anticipated. In addition, there were substantial contacts between Bush and the plaintiffs prior to the crash as previously mentioned which makes the exercise of jurisdiction by the State of Illinois fair and reasonable in the circumstances. (*Nelson*, 11 Ill.2d at 384, 143 N.E.2d 673.) (Also see to the same effect Nev.Rev.Stat. tit. 2, ch. 14, sec. 14.080.)

For these reasons I would affirm the order of the trial court.

Affirmed.

STAMOS, J., specially concurring.

DOWNING, P. J., dissenting.

STAMOS, Justice, specially concurring:

I would also affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion of defendant, Beech Aircraft Corp. (hereinafter "Beech"), to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. However, in my estimation, defendant is amenable to service of process in Illinois by virtue of its contractual relationship with its distributor, Hartzog Aviation Co. (hereinafter "Hartzog").

Section 13.3 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 110 par. 13.3) provides for service on a corporation as follows:

"A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of said corporation found anywhere in the State; or, (2) in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law. A private corporation may also be notified by publication and mail in like manner and with like effect as individuals."

Section 16(1) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 16(1)) provides in part as follows:

"Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this State; * * *."

Plaintiff concedes that Beech has no registered agent in the State of Illinois, and does not suggest that the directorates of Beech and Hartzog are interlocking. The issue before this court, therefore, is whether the office of Hartzog is agent in fact for service of process upon Beech.

Section 16 of the Civil Practice Act reflects a conscious legislative purpose to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. (*Nelson v. Miller* (1957), 11 Ill.2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679.) Within this context, modern constitutional

principles governing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation were enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. In *International Shoe*, the Court noted that continuous and systematic corporate operations may establish "sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligation" incurred there. 326 U.S. at 320, 66 S.Ct. at 160.

Where the business done by a foreign corporation in the state of the forum is of a sufficiently substantial nature, it has been held permissible for the state to entertain a suit against such corporation even though the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its conduct within the state. (*Gray v. American Radiator and Sanitary Corp.* (1961), 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761.) Similarly, where the facts indicate that one corporation so controls the affairs of another corporation that the two entities are essentially one, the court will disregard the corporate entities and hold service of process on one corporation effective as to the other. See *Rymal v. Ulbeco* (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 799, 338 N.E.2d 209.

Application of these principles to the case at bar presents two questions for analysis:

- (1) Whether the activities of Hartzog, defendant's distributor, are chargeable to defendant; and
- (2) Whether such activities are sufficiently pervasive to justify the exercise of jurisdiction in Illinois over a cause of action not directly related to these activities.

In my estimation, there can be little question but that the activities of Hartzog, defendant's distributor, are attributable to defendant foreign corporation. The amount of control which Beech was capable of exercising is apparent from consideration of several determinative factors. These salient factors appear in the contract between Beech and

Hartzog. Implementation of this contract is outlined in the deposition of Karl Berg, a marketing manager employed by Beech Aircraft.

The distributorship arrangement between Beech and Hartzog indicates that Beech enjoyed extensive control over its products in the State of Illinois and considerable supervision over its distributor. For example:

- a. Hartzog is required to submit purchase orders for all airplanes ordered by Hartzog under the agreement and all such purchase orders are subject to approval and acceptance by Beechcraft at its principal place of business;
- b. Hartzog is permitted to sell Beechcraft airplanes within a given area of the State of Illinois;
- c. Hartzog is required to devote its full sales efforts to the sales of such aircraft;
- d. Hartzog is required to price the aircraft it sells;
- e. Hartzog is required to maintain sales control records and advertise Beechcraft airplanes exclusively and completely in accord with the directives and policies of Beechcraft;
- f. Hartzog is required to perform all warranty, maintenance and repair service on all Beechcraft airplanes covered by warranty provisions of purchase which aircraft were in Hartzog's area of responsibility during their warranty period and regardless of whether or not they were airplanes sold by Hartzog;
- g. Hartzog agreed to provide any and all facilities at its place of business which were necessary by Beechcraft to distribute and sell Beechcraft products;
- b. Hartzog could not move its place of business without obtaining the prior written consent of Beech. In addition, Beechcraft through its officers and employees could enter Hartzog's sales area to make marketing

surveys or gather any other information Beech may desire and to call upon and examine the facilities and/or personnel of Hartzog during business hours and to do anything else which Beech believed necessary and proper for increased sales;

- i. Beech could inspect the complete operation of Hartzog from time to time including the business facilities, records, supplies and personnel;
- j. Beechcraft trademark was allowed to be used by Hartzog;
- k. Under certain conditions, Beechcraft could terminate the sales agreement without any advance notice.

Moreover, the testimony of Karl Berg describes the occasional but direct intervention of the Beech Aircraft Corp. into the Illinois market and further establishes defendant's voluntary invocation of the benefits of the State of Illinois. (*Muffo v. Forsyth* (1976), 37 Ill.App.3d 6, 345 N.E.2d 149.) Berg's testimony has been abstracted as follows:

"... With regard to business activities in Illinois, Berg testified among other things as follows: That he was employed directly by Beech Aircraft Corporation in Wichita, Kansas, and had been for nine years and that this present position as of December 12, 1974 was that of marketing manager for reciprocating aircraft. That he had held previous sales managerial positions for the prior six to eight years. As a consequence of his managerial duties, Mr. Berg testified that on one occasion, he visited Hartzog Aviation with the express purpose of promoting the sale of Beech aircraft known as a 'Duke' model to a prospective customer of Hartzog. That he himself was actually involved in the promotion of the aircraft to the sales prospect, including coming into personal contact with the prospect. That he engaged in flying the Beechcraft airplane Hartzog desired to sell to the prospect. No sale was consummated as a result of this visit. Mr. Berg testified that he had visited Hartzog Aviation probably a dozen times

within his nine years at Beech. In addition, Mr. Berg testified that in the spring of 1974, Beechcraft, in conjunction with Hartzog, sponsored a sales program in Illinois called 'An Evening with Beechcraft' in which four of the Wichita based employees came into Illinois and put on a film and slide presentation and hosted a dinner for sales prospects in Illinois. There were approximately 60 prospects who attended that dinner. No sales were consummated at that time."

Such evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates a series of corporate operations by Beech Aircraft, both directly and through its distributor, sufficient to establish its presence in the State of Illinois within the context of *International Shoe*. I note that similar results have obtained in various other jurisdictions which have had occasion to consider distributor contracts akin to that involved in the instant case. *Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (D.C.E.D.S.C., 1965), 237 F.Supp. 393, *aff'd*, 349 F.2d 60 (C.A. 4, 1965); *Dunn v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (D.C.E.D.Pa., 1967), 276 F.Supp. 91; *see also, Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (D.C.E.D.Pa., 1967), 276 F.Supp. 58; *Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft Inc.*, (C.A. 5, 1964), 332 F.2d 135.

Nor can it be doubted that these activities are sufficiently pervasive to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause not directly related to such activities. The annual volume of business conducted by Hartzog does not appear of record. However, it is not disputed that the day to day sales and service of Beech Aircraft conducted by an apparently solvent firm, such as Hartzog Aviation, constitutes activity which may be fairly categorized as a substantial and systematic business operation. As previously noted, within this context, Beech controls Hartzog's sales and service policies, facilities, public relations, accounts and records, and marketing practices. This activity leaves small doubt that Beech has intentionally entered the Illinois market and is actively doing business in this state. Rather than use its own directly employed personnel, the corporation chose to enter into the state by acquiring broad su-

pervisory control over a distributor-sales-corporation. The nature of this broad control and the extent to which it was exercised is an adequate basis for finding Hartzog to be the agent of Beech and, thus, the proper and capable recipient of service of process upon Beech.

Defendant's reliance upon the case of *Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (C.A. 9, 1974), 521 F.2d 1298, is not controlling. In *Aanestad*, with respect to a distributorship arrangement similar to that at issue in the case at bar, the court held that the activities of Beech through its subsidiary were not sufficiently pervasive to justify jurisdiction in California of a cause of action unrelated to such activities. It does not appear that evidence similar to the Berg deposition was considered by the court in determination of that appeal and the court expressly refrained from ruling on the question of whether the activities of a subsidiary may subject the parent corporation to jurisdiction in the state in which the subsidiary is incorporated or doing business.

Similarly, the case of *Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy, etc., Co.* (1925), 267 U.S. 333, 45 S.Ct. 250, 69 L.Ed. 634, is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. That case held only that the mere presence of an independent, albeit wholly-owned, subsidiary may not be equated with the presence of the parent for purposes of establishing that the parent was "doing business" in the forum jurisdiction in order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the parent. In the case *sub judice*, the activities of Hartzog and Beech appear to have been joint. The broad control exercised over the distributor and the direct intercession of Beech employees in Illinois serves to distinguish the rationale of *Cannon* from that of the case at bar and establishes the "minimum contacts" requisite to the exercise of *in personam* jurisdiction under *International Shoe*.

In my opinion, the order of the trial court denying defendant Beech's motion to quash service of process and to dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction was proper and for the aforementioned reasons should be affirmed.

DOWNING, Presiding Justice, dissenting:

For the following reasons I would reverse the circuit court of Cook County.

Plaintiffs in their brief in this court, in substance, asserted they would demonstrate that jurisdiction properly attaches in Illinois either (a) when defendant is "present" and "doing business" in Illinois, or (b) when defendant Beech committed a tortious act within this state (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 17(1)(b)); i. e., "defendant's negligent causation of pecuniary loss to Illinois resident survivors of the two accidents."

Certain facts must be restated. The Beech aircraft was not manufactured in Illinois. It was manufactured by a Delaware corporation (Beech) whose principal office was in Kansas. It was originally sold in 1966 to a firm located in Texas; then in 1968, the plane was sold to a firm located in Nevada; then in 1971, sold to Coleman Aircraft Corp. (Coleman) of Morton Grove, Illinois, which firm, in 1971, arranged to sell the plane to a British company. While the plane was being flown to the British firm, the ill-fated accident occurred in Canada on December 10, 1971.

There is nothing in the record to indicate or suggest that (1) the subject plane was manufactured in Illinois; or (2) defendant Beech or Hartzog Aviation, Inc. of Rockford, Illinois ever sold or had any connection with the sale of his plane to anyone in the state of Illinois; or that the decedents had any connection with Coleman. With this by way of background, it is important to examine the two theories of my colleagues.

At the outset it is to be noted that once jurisdiction has been challenged, the burden of proving its presence rests on the party asserting it. *Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp.* (1975), 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 26; *Williams v. Connolly* (D.C.Minn.1964), 227 F.Supp. 539.

Tortious Act Theory

Was a tortious act committed in Illinois so as to ensnare Beech in this jurisdictional quagmire? My answer is "no." I cannot stretch the words of section 17(1)(b) to believe the legislature ever foresaw such a result, or if they did, then I think the statute violates the due process rights of Beech.

Section 17, so far as pertinent, provides:

"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:

* * *

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;

* * *

(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this Section."

The affirming opinion states: "I believe that a tortious act was committed by the delivery into Illinois of a plane that was allegedly unreasonably dangerous." Yet there is nothing in the record to indicate either Beech or Hartzog had anything whatsoever to do with that delivery. It might be argued that when Beech manufactured the plane and introduced it into the stream of commerce by a sale to a Texas firm, it would be ultimately responsible for a delivery in Illinois. I am not prepared to stretch that fiction to such an absurd conclusion.

The plaintiffs base their claim on the theory of strict liability of Beech as the airplane manufacturer. Because the plane, at least five years after its manufacture in Kansas,

was in Illinois prior to its last flight, it is contended, "[a] duty was owed to the residents of Illinois."

In the cited case of *Micher v. Brown* (1973), 54 Ill.2d 539, 541, 301 N.E.2d 307, a case involving an auto-truck accident in Illinois, the supreme court concerned itself with the question of common law negligence. In so doing, it discussed a duty owed by the truck manufacturer to the decedent. In discussing the issues of duty to examine reasonable care in designing a motor vehicle and the question of foreseeability, the supreme court placed some restraint on the doctrine of duty. In my opinion there is nothing in that case to provide the plaintiffs under these circumstances a steady prop upon which to base jurisdiction.

It is said that the word "'tortious' * * should include the delivery of the allegedly defective plane." But who delivered this plane in Illinois? Not Beech or Hartzog. Certainly this type of prop is much too unstable to support a theory of jurisdiction.

It should be noted that nothing I say in any way suggests plaintiffs might not have a strict product liability case against Beech. I am simply saying the courts of Illinois should not be used to find out.

Nor do I think the *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95; *Nelson v. Miller* (1957), 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673; or *Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.* (1961), 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 cases support plaintiffs' theory of jurisdiction under the "tortious act theory."

*International Shoe*¹ did not involve a tortious act. It held that a Delaware corporation employing shoe salesmen in the state of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in Washington to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund.

¹ For a recent discussion of a state court's exercise of in rem or quasi-in rem jurisdiction and the "minimum contact" test of *International Shoe*, see *Shaffer v. Heitner*, U.S., 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

Nelson involved an Illinois resident who was injured in Illinois while assisting an employee of a Wisconsin firm that was delivering a gas cooking stove sold to the plaintiff in Illinois. The factual background is as different from the instant case as day is from night. Thus, in discussing section 17(1)(b) and the word "tortious," the supreme court said, "[t]he essential question in cases of this type is where the action is to be tried." As said by Justice Schaeffer:

"The substantial objective of the new jurisdictional provisions is to enable the plaintiff to obtain a trial of the issues of liability and of damages in this State, *when the circumstances make it the appropriate and convenient forum for that purpose.*" (Emphasis added.) (11 Ill.2d at 393, 143 N.E.2d at 681.)

As has been noted, Beech was not the author of any act or omission within the state of Illinois which established circumstances to make this state the appropriate forum.

Gray involved a water heater, manufactured in Ohio, which exploded in Illinois injuring the plaintiff, an Illinois resident. As stated by the supreme court in considering section 17(1)(b), a jurisdictional question depends on whether the tortious act was committed in Illinois. The supreme court said:

"The wrong in the case at bar did not originate in the conduct of a servant physically present here, but arose instead from acts performed at the place of manufacture. Only the *consequences* occurred in Illinois. It is well established, however, that in law *the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable.*" (Emphasis added.) (22 Ill.2d at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762.)

In the instant case the consequences, and the last event necessary to render Beech possibly liable, occurred in Canada. The consequences and last event in both *Nelson* and *Gray* clearly took place in Illinois. To suggest that the

consequences and last event in the subject case took place in Illinois is to strain reality beyond reasonable credibility.

To determine if there are minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process requirements necessitates a case-by-case examination of the facts. What are the minimum contacts of Beech to Illinois in this case? It is suggested that because the plane was centered in Illinois when the decedents boarded the plane and started their trip to England, there is sufficient minimum contact to meet due process requirements. I think not. Beech had nothing to do with the plane being in Illinois, nor the trip to England. So far as the record before this court indicates, the only contact the decedents had with the plane occurred in the fatal trip. As was said in *McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (7th Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d 26, 32, " * * * there remain due process outer limits on the reach of a state's long-arm jurisdiction." The thin thread of pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs in Illinois, in my opinion, is too weak a connection to lift these facts outside the reach of the due process clause. I believe the minimum contact standard elucidated in *International Shoe* is violated.

It is suggested that Beech caused the effects in the state of Illinois, and the effects could have been anticipated. What effects? Plaintiffs are the administrators of the estates of two deceased pilots, both of whom were Illinois residents. As I understand the real effect of the trial court's action and its affirmance by this plurality opinion, the Illinois residents are to be protected regardless of due process constraints. I do not find any tortious act in Illinois. To hold that there is such a tortious act, in my opinion, clearly violates the due process rights of Beech.

Accordingly, I cannot find that plaintiffs should prevail under the so-called "tortious act theory."

Doing Business Theory

I concur with Justice Jiganti's conclusion that he does "not believe that Beech engaged in a continuous and systematic course of business" in the state of Illinois. It is said that defendant Beech is amenable to service of process in Illinois by virtue of its contractual relationship with its

distributor Hartzog. Section 13.3 of the Civil Practice Act provides the nexus between non-resident Beech and Hartzog. The basis for this jurisdiction is that the office of Hartzog is agent-in-fact for service of process upon Beech. In other words, Beech is present and doing business in Illinois.

Because Hartzog had a sales agreement with Beech, whereby it acted as a franchisee for the sale of new Beech airplanes in part of the state of Illinois, and to perform service and maintenance on customer airplanes, it is concluded that Beech is present within the state of Illinois within the context of *International Shoe*. Again I disagree on the basis that the facts in *International Shoe* are sufficiently distinguishable so as to destroy any support it might offer. In that case the salesmen were regularly employed and resided in the state of Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated based upon the amount of the sales in the state of Washington. A dispute arose over whether their out-of-state employer was required to pay to a state unemployment compensation fund. No one could really argue that there were sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just to enforce such obligations against the out-of-state employer. Those contacts did not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

But, so far as this record shows, there can be no comparison between the activities of Beech or Hartzog in Illinois and the activities of the shoe salesmen in the state of Washington. As said in *International Shoe*, "[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." (326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160.) I do not believe that due process is satisfied in the case at bar because, in my opinion, the activities of neither Beech nor Hartzog constitute "doing business" in Illinois.

What then is "doing business"? In the recent case of *Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele* (1977), Ill., 6 Ill.

Dec., N.E.2d, our supreme court discussed this phrase as it is used in the context of the venue statute. In doing so it distinguished the phrase as it is used in a jurisdictional context. It is significant to note the following language:

“No firm rule as to what constitutes doing business for jurisdictional purposes is discernible from the cases. As Judge Learned Hand stated: ‘It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass.’ *Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.* (2d Cir. 1930), 45 F.2d 139, 142.” 6 Ill.Dec. p., N.E.2d p.

So now we must look at just what facts are involved in this case. Beech had a sales agreement with Hartzog whereby the latter was franchised to sell and service Beech airplanes in 19 counties of Illinois.² The agreement was for one year with a 30-day termination clause. Although a copy of the agreement in the record was for 1973-1974, and the accident took place in 1971, we can find nothing in the record as to whether a similar agreement was in effect on December 10, 1971. As this point was not raised, we assume for purposes of this discussion that such an agreement was in effect in 1971. Considerable significance is placed upon the provision of the Beech-Hartzog agreement, which by its terms has as its stated objective the sale of seven airplanes. But rather than relying solely upon boiler plate provisions in a franchise agreement, it seems to me that it is equally meaningful to stress the realities of the relationship.

Beech is incorporated in Delaware and has its offices and principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas. Beech has no officers, directors, or employees living, residing, or stationed in Illinois. It has no offices or other places of business in Illinois. Beech is not qualified, authorized, or

² In addition to the 19 of 102 counties in Illinois, the agreement provided Hartzog was franchised in certain counties in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

otherwise licensed or chartered to do business in Illinois. Beech owns no real estate in Illinois and pays no taxes here. It holds no licenses, charters, or permits issued by this state or by any subdivision thereof. Beech has appointed no agent for service of process in Illinois.

The test for “doing business” should be a pragmatic one. (*Bryant v. Finnish National Airline* (1965), 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208 N.E.2d 439.) As in the *International Shoe* case, the activity within the state should have that continuity and permanence which gives rise to the liability sued on. It should be a continuous and systematic course of business. More contacts are required than sales and sales promotion within the state of Illinois by independent nonexclusive sales representatives. *Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp.* (1975), 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 27; cf. *Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.* (7th Cir. 1968), 407 F.2d 639, 642, 643.

Hartzog is not a party defendant. Neither Beech’s activities in Illinois, nor those of Hartzog in Illinois, had anything to do with this cause of action. To say otherwise is to engage in fiction bordering on fantasy. Applying a realistic, pragmatic test to the facts before us, Beech’s activities in Illinois—if any—are not so pervasive to justify jurisdiction in Illinois of a cause of action not related to Beech’s alleged Illinois activities. *Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp.* (9th Cir. 1974), 521 F.2d 1298, 1301, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 998, 95 S.Ct. 313, 42 L.Ed.2d 272.

To hold this state has jurisdiction under the minimal contacts set forth in this record would subject Beech, or any similar corporation, to suit in any state of the United States. To me this would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In my opinion it would violate defendant’s due process rights.

In conclusion, the delicate balancing of the rights of the party litigants is always a troublesome task. Coupled with those rights is always the problem of accommodating witnesses. Someone is always inconvenienced. But on balance it would appear, that aside from the attorneys, a trial

of this cause in Illinois would inconvenience more people. I do not think plaintiffs have established a proper basis for jurisdiction in Illinois. Therefore, for all of these reasons I would reverse and remand with directions that the circuit court of Cook County grant the motion to quash service of process and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

NO. 62340

IN THE APPELLATE COURT, STATE OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

GALE BRABAND and ELIZABETH FORSYTHE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

vs.

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP., a corp.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and

KOLLSMAN COMPANY, Division of SUN CHEMICAL
CORP., and EAGLE AIRCRAFT SERVICES, LTD.,
Defendants.

ORDER

This cause coming to be heard on the Petition of Defendant-Appellant, BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, To Issue A Certificate of Importance Under Rule 316; due notice having been given and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant-Appellant's petition is granted and a certificate of importance is hereby issued to the Illinois Supreme Court.

AFFIRMED

Justice *Robert J. Downing*
Justice *John J. Stamos*
Justice *M. R. Jiganti*

LORD, BISSELL & BROOK (H. GRIFFIN)
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
115 S. LaSalle St.
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443-0342

OPINION OF ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

GALE BRABAND *et al.*, Appellees, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION *et al.*—Beech Aircraft Corporation, Appellant.)

Opinion filed Oct. 6, 1978.—Rehearing denied Dec. 1, 1978.

1. JURISDICTION—*due process must be satisfied and a foreign corporation must be present and doing business in Illinois before it may be subjected to this State's jurisdiction.* Assuming that due process is satisfied, the assertion of Illinois jurisdiction over a foreign corporation has traditionally required a finding that it is present and doing business within this jurisdiction. (Pp. 554-55.)

2. JURISDICTION—*whether the activities of a foreign corporation may subject it to the jurisdiction of a State should be determined on the facts of each case.* The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by a foreign corporation in a State to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to that State's jurisdiction should be determined in each case. (P. 556.)

3. JURISDICTION—*whether to assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is a choice left to the State once due process is satisfied.* Assuming that due process is satisfied, the decision whether to take or decline jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is left to the legislature and the courts of the State. (P. 556.)

4. JURISDICTION—*the principles of jurisdiction reflect the State's interest in providing redress to those within the ambit of its legitimate protective policy.* The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy. (Pp. 556-57.)

5. JURISDICTION—*jurisdictional provisions must be fair and reasonable and give a defendant adequate notice and an opportunity to defend.* Jurisdictional provisions must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances and must give a defendant adequate notice of the claim against him

and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear and be heard in his defense. (P. 557.)

6. JURISDICTION—*the Civil Practice Act attempts to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause.* Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971 ch. 110, pars. 16, 17) reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. (P. 557.)

7. JURISDICTION—*jurisdiction over a foreign corporation depends upon the type of in-State activity and whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in this State.* Whether a foreign corporation may be subjected to jurisdiction in Illinois is dependent upon the quality and nature of the activity in which the defendant is engaged and whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit which is brought in this State. (P. 558.)

8. JURISDICTION—*when a foreign-corporate airplane manufacturer's sales and promotional activities within Illinois are sufficient to subject it to Illinois jurisdiction concerning a suit arising over a crash of its used plane in Canada.* An airplane manufacturer that is a corporation not licensed to do business in the State of Illinois may, consistent with due process, be considered present and doing business in this State and amenable to service of process under sections 13.3 and 16 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, pars. 13.3, 16) where recovery is sought for the death of two Illinois residents, whose used plane manufactured by the defendant crashes in Canada on a flight originating in Illinois, and the defendant has had extensive contacts with an independent corporate distributor in Illinois who is permitted to sell its products and whom it frequently visits in order to promote sales and with whom it has sponsored a sales program with a film and slide presentation and dinner for sale prospects, and where the defendant also has maintained advertisements in the Chicago metropolitan area telephone directories to advertise and indicate the locations where its

products and parts might be purchased, since such facts show that the defendant has engaged in extensive activity within the State designed to effect sales to Illinois residents and that the defendant could reasonably assume that the airplanes which it manufactured would be owned by residents of Illinois and might be flown to other states or even foreign countries. (Pp. 550-60.)

KLUCZYNSKI, J., took no part.

Appellate citation: 51 Ill. App. 3d 296.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Nicholas J. Bua, Judge, presiding.

Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (Gary W. Westerberg, Hugh C. Griffin and Richard E. Mueller, of counsel), for appellant.

Philip H. Corboy and Associates, of Chicago (Philip H. Corboy, of counsel), for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 70, par. 1 *et seq.*) plaintiffs, Gale Braband and Elizabeth Forsythe, administrators of their respective deceased husbands' estates, brought these consolidated actions in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant Beech Aircraft Corporation, hereafter defendant, and other defendants not involved in this appeal. The circuit court denied defendant's motion to quash the service of summons and included in its order the findings requisite to an application for leave to appeal. (Supreme Court Rule 308, 58 Ill. 2d R. 308.) The appellate court allowed defendant's application for leave to appeal, affirmed the order of the circuit court (51 Ill. App. 3d 296), and granted a certificate of importance permitting an appeal to this court. Supreme Court Rule 316, 58 Ill. 2d R. 316.

The agreed statement of facts filed in the circuit court shows that an airplane, designed and manufactured by de-

fendant, crashed as it approached an airport near Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories, Canada, and that the three pilots on board were killed. Plaintiffs are the administrators of the estates of James L. Braband and Donald Forsythe, two of the pilots. The airplane was manufactured by defendant in Wichita, Kansas, and in 1966 was sold by defendant to Tex-Sun Beechcraft, Inc., located in San Antonio, Texas. In 1968 Tex-Sun sold it to Mission Broadcasting Company, located in Reno, Nevada. In 1971, Mission Broadcasting sold the aircraft to Coleman Aircraft Corporation of Morton Grove, Illinois. After being based in Illinois for a period of time, the aircraft was apparently sold by Coleman to Eagle Aircraft Services, Ltd., of London, England, and at the time of the crash was being flown from Morton Grove to London. The decedents were, and their surviving dependents have at all times been, residents of Illinois. When the airplane crashed it was owned by either Coleman or Eagle and was being piloted by Eagle's employee, James Going.

In affirming the circuit court's order, the appellate court majority filed two separate opinions. The lead opinion based the affirmance on the ground that defendant was amenable to service under section 17 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 17) for the reason that it had, within the contemplation of that section, committed a "tortious act" within this jurisdiction. The rationale of the special concurrence was that by reason of its contractual relationship with Hartzog Aviation Co., a distributor of defendant's products, defendant was present and doing business in Illinois and was therefore amenable to service of process under the provisions of sections 16 and 13.3 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, ch. 110, pars. 16, 13.3).

The statutes in pertinent part provide:

"Sec. 13.3. Service on private corporations. A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of said corporation found anywhere in the State; or (2) in any other manner now or hereafter

permitted by law. A private corporation may also be notified by publication and mail in like manner and with like effect as individuals." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 13.3.

"Sec. 16. Personal service outside State.

(1) Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this State; otherwise it shall have the force and effect of service by publication." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 16(1).

"Sec. 17. Act submitting to jurisdiction—Process.

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:

(a) The transaction of any business within this State;

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;

* * *

(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.

(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this Section.

(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 17.

In count I of plaintiffs' amended complaint directed against defendant as the manufacturer of the airplane, and another defendant as the manufacturer of the altimeter, a component part of the airplane, it was alleged:

"At the time and place aforesaid, the airplane and the altimeter were designed, manufactured, assembled and sold in a condition that was not reasonably safe in one or more of the following respects:

a. That the airplane was not aerodynamically sound and was likely to crash when used and/or flown in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

b. That the altimeter was manufactured in such a manner that it did not reflect accurate altitude readings for the airplane when said airplane was airborne and when the aircraft was being flown in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable.

c. That the altimeter was manufactured and sold without any warnings that it was likely not to reflect accurate altitude readings for the aircraft when said aircraft was airborne and when the aircraft was being flown in a manner which was reasonably foreseeable."

Defendant concedes that if it was amenable to service of process in Illinois, such service was properly made. It contends, however, that the appellate and circuit courts erred for the reasons that this cause did not arise out of the commission of a tortious act within the State of Illinois and that the activities of Hartzog Aviation, Inc., a separate independent Illinois corporation, did not, in this case, serve to subject defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois. It is plaintiffs' position that defendant committed a tortious act in Illinois within the contemplation of section 17 of the Civil Practice Act and that defendant

was "present and doing business in Illinois" and therefore amenable to service of process.

The question whether a State may appropriately assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation has been the subject of frequent litigation. Recently, in *Shaffer v. Heitner* (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 97 S. Ct. 2569, the Supreme Court reviewed the pertinent authorities commencing with *Pennoyer v. Neff* (1878), 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565, and concluded that the standards elucidated in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154, continued to be the test of a State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. The standards prescribed in *International Shoe Co.* are that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" (326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158.) In *Shaffer*, after quoting the foregoing language from *International Shoe Co.*, the court said:

"[T]he inquiry into the State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation appropriately focused not on whether the corporation was 'present' but on whether there have been

'such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' [326 U.S. 310, 317, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158.]

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's activities in the forum could not resolve the question of reasonableness:

"Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-

tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment *in personam* against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.' [326 U.S. 310, 319, 90 L. Ed. 95, 104, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160.]" 433 U.S. 186, 203-04, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 697, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2580.

Assuming that "due process is satisfied" the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation has traditionally required the finding that it was "present and doing business" within this jurisdiction. (See discussion, *Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele* (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 321, 327.) The difficulties encountered in the application of this concept to given factual situations were noted in *Shaffer v. Heitner* (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 97 S. Ct. 2569, wherein the Supreme Court said:

"The motorists' consent theory was easy to administer since it required only a finding that the out-of-state driver had used the State's roads. By contrast, both the fictions of implied consent to service on the part of a foreign corporation and of corporate presence required a finding that the corporation was 'doing business' in the forum State. Defining the criteria for making that finding and deciding whether they were met absorbed much judicial energy. See, e.g., *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S., at 317-319. While the essentially quantitative tests which emerged from these cases purported simply to identify circumstances under which presence or consent could be attributed to the corporation, it became clear that they were in fact attempting to ascertain 'what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to local suit'. *Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert*, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.)." 433 U.S. 186, 203, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 697, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2579.

In *St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gitchoff* (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 38, the court said:

“In the context of our evolving concepts of jurisdictional requirements, the Supreme Court has observed:

“‘[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.’ *Shaffer v. Heitner* (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 212, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 703, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584.” 68 Ill. 2d 38, 46.

“The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each case.” (*Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.* (1952), 342 U.S. 437, 445, 96 L. Ed. 485, 492, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418.) Assuming that upon the facts shown by the record “due process is satisfied” the decision whether to take or decline jurisdiction is left to the General Assembly and the courts of this State. *Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.* (1952), 342 U.S. 437, 448, 96 L. Ed. 485, 494, 72 S. Ct. 413, 420.

Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act were amended in 1955 (1955 Ill. Laws 2238, 2245-46), and shortly after the amendments became effective on January 1, 1956, their validity was challenged in *Nelson v. Miller* (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 378. In 1954 the defendant in *Nelson*, a Wisconsin resident engaged in the business of selling appliances, had sent one of his employees to deliver appliances to the plaintiff in Illinois. In the course of that delivery, as the result of the negligence of defendant’s employee, the plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff filed suit in 1955 and made two unsuccessful attempts to serve the defendant with summons in Illinois. In February 1956, summons was served personally on the defendant in Wisconsin.

The circuit court allowed the defendant’s motion to quash the summons, and the plaintiff appealed. In reversing the order and upholding the service of process on the defendant the court said:

“The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the State’s legitimate protective policy. The limits on the exercise of jurisdiction are not ‘mechanical or quantitative’ (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945),) but are to be found only in the requirement that the provisions made for this purpose must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and must give to the defendant adequate notice of the claim against him, and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear and be heard in his defense.” (11 Ill. 2d 378, 384.)

The court concluded that “Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.” 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389.

From the agreed statement of facts it does not appear that plaintiffs’ causes of action arose from any act of defendant’s distributor Hartzog, or that the relationship between Hartzog and defendant was in any manner connected with the occurrence in which plaintiffs’ decedents were killed; nor does it appear that plaintiffs’ causes of action arose from “the transaction of any business within this State” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 17(1)(a)). Relying principally upon *Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.* (1925), 267 U.S. 333, 69 L. Ed. 634, 45 S. Ct. 250, and its progeny, defendant argues that Mr. Justice Stamos, specially concurring in the appellate court’s affirmance of the circuit court’s order, erroneously concluded that by reason of its contractual relationship with its distributor, Hartzog, defendant was “present and doing business” in Illinois. We note that *Cannon* was

decided more than 20 years prior to the decision in *International Shoe Co.* and did not purport to decide any question other than whether conducting business through a wholly owned subsidiary rendered the parent corporation amenable to process in the State where the subsidiary did business. The Supreme Court stated that:

"The obstacle insisted upon is that the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant, a foreign corporation, was not within the State. No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the federal Government, is directly presented. The claim that jurisdiction exists is not rested upon the provisions of any state statute or upon any local practice dealing with the subject. The resistance to the assumption of jurisdiction is not urged on the ground that to subject the defendant to suit in North Carolina would be an illegal interference with interstate commerce. Compare *International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky*, 234 U.S. 579, 587-89. The question is simply whether the corporate separation carefully maintained must be ignored in determining the existence of jurisdiction." (267 U.S. 333, 336, 69 L. Ed. 634, 642, 45 S. Ct. 250, 251.)

In our opinion the agreed statement of facts shows that defendant engaged in activities in Illinois in addition to those conducted by Hartzog, and we need not, therefore, decide whether Hartzog's activities standing alone would serve as a sufficient basis to assert jurisdiction.

As required by *International Shoe* and *Shaffer*, we consider "the quality and nature of the activity" in which defendant was engaged and whether it is reasonable to require defendant "to defend the particular suit which is brought [here]." (*International Shoe Co. v. Washington* (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 104, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 160.) These actions are brought by Illinois residents to recover for the wrongful deaths of Illinois residents during a flight which originated in Illinois and are clearly "within the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy." (*Nelson v. Miller*, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 384.) The

agreed statement of facts shows that defendant and Hartzog are parties to a written agreement under the terms of which Hartzog is permitted to sell defendant's products within a given area of the State of Illinois and which, *inter alia*, requires it to perform all warranty, maintenance and repair service on all Beechcraft planes covered by warranty provisions regardless of whether they were sold by Hartzog. Further, defendant was empowered to inspect Hartzog's complete operation from time to time, including its business facilities, records, supplies and personnel, and could, under certain conditions, without advance notice, terminate the sales agreement. It also appears that defendant's marketing manager frequently visited Hartzog with the express purpose of promoting the sales of defendant's aircraft; that defendant, together with Hartzog, had sponsored a sales program in Illinois which included a film and slide presentation and a dinner for sales prospects in Illinois; and that, for a period of at least five years, advertisements had appeared in the Chicago Metropolitan Area telephone directories to advertise and indicate the presence of locations where defendant's products and parts could be purchased. In view of defendant's activities within Illinois designed to effect sales to residents of Illinois, defendant could reasonably assume that airplanes which it manufactured would be owned by residents of Illinois and in view of the high degree of mobility peculiar to its products could further assume that they would be flown both within Illinois and into other States, or, as in this instance, to other countries. We hold, therefore, that as reflected by the agreed statement of facts, defendant's activities show sufficient contacts with this State so that requiring it to defend this action does not offend "traditional motions of fair play and substantial justice."

We hold further that these activities show defendant to be present and doing business in Illinois and amenable to service of process under sections 13.3 and 16 of the Civil Practice Act. *St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gitchoff* (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 38, 43.

In view of our holding we do not consider plaintiffs' contention that defendant committed a tortious act within the contemplation of section 17(1)(b) of the Civil Practice Act.

For the reasons herein stated the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk

Supreme Court Building

Springfield, Ill. 62706

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December 1, 1978

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No. 49954 — Gale Braband, et al., appellees, vs. Beech Aircraft Corp., a corp., appellant. Appeal, Appellate Court, First District.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for rehearing in the above entitled cause. Mr. Justice Kluczynski took no part.

Very truly yours,

Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court
